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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of participation in job creation schemes (JCSs) on
job search outcomes in the context of the turbulent East German labor market in the
aftermath of the German reunification. High job destruction characterized the economic
environment. JCSs were heavily used in order to cushion this development. Using data
from 1990-1999 and building upon the timing-of-events approach, we estimate multivariate
discrete time duration models taking selection based on both observed and unobserved
heterogeneity into account. Our results indicate that after initial negative effects during the
typical program duration of twelve months, probably driven by reduced job search effort
during participation resulting in a rearrangement of the job queue, the impact on the job
finding probability becomes insignificantly positive. Additional results, however, suggest
that female and highly skilled participants leave unemployment quicker than other groups,
which results in highly skilled women benefiting from participation. In general, we find no
significant impact on post-unemployment employment stability. Our results are robust to
allowing for random treatment effects. Also taking into account endogenous participation
in training programs, endogenous censoring, or multiple treatment effects do not change
the results.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the impact of participation in job creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungs-
maßnahmen, JCSs) on job search outcomes in the context of the turbulent East German labor
market in the aftermath of the German reunification. The East German economy plunged into
a deep recession immediately after the German reunification in 1990. The transition from a
centrally planned to a market-based economic system led to plant closures and mass-layoffs,
leading to a sharp increase in the unemployment rate from virtually zero in 1990 to about 10%
in 1991. Active labor market policies (ALMPs) were implemented on a large scale to fight the
unemployment crisis. Hereby, JCSs that offer temporary work opportunities for the unemployed
in the public and nonprofit sector played a prominent role. These schemes reached an all-time
high in 1992 when on average 388,000 individuals were employed in JCSs and expenditures
of the German Federal Government and the German Federal Employment Agency amounted to
10.4 billion DM (7.8 billione in 2015 prices) in East Germany (Spitznagel (1992)). This sum
is equivalent to 4.4% of the East German GDP.1
The main official objective of providing these JCSs was to improve the employment
prospects of the participants. There are at least two potential channels how JCSs might ac-
complish this. To fix ideas, we are arguing in the framework of a labor market with search
frictions (for a more formal analysis see the Supplemental Material of Crépon and van den Berg
(2016)). By providing work experience JCSs can increase participants’ attachment to the labor
market. This stronger bond might motivate the participants to intensify their search effort for a
regular job. At the same time JCSs can provide the participant with the ability to signal their
positive work attitude. Both, increased search effort and the signaling ability have a positive
impact on the job offer arrival rate and the ability to stay on a regular job. The second channel
consists of the potential ability of JCSs to shift the wage offer distribution for the participants.
Naturally, job seekers become more attractive for employers if their human capital is raised
and JCSs offer a number of possibilities to achieve this. Participants acquire cognitive skills by
learning–on–the–job, work experience and short training courses, which are sometimes offered
in the context of JCSs. Being placed in a work context by way of JCS participation can also
foster soft skills.
As Crépon and van den Berg (2016) show both, an increased job offer arrival rate and a shift
in the wage offer distribution due to participation in ALMP programs, increases the exit rate
from unemployment compared to the situation before participation.
The effectiveness of participation in ALMPs might depend on the state of the economy. In
periods with low job destruction rates and relatively high job offer arrival rates the opportunity
costs of participating in an ALMP might be relatively high, i.e., searching for a job could be
more beneficial because the probability of finding a regular job is high. In contrast to that, in
periods with low job offer arrival rates positive effects of ALMPs will carry more weight, as a
1Federal Employment Agency (1993) and Federal Statistical Office (1993).
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continued job search is less rewarding. The role of the state of the economy is probably more
relevant for longer programs like JCSs and training. They offer the possibility to keep in contact
to the labor market as it needs time until the economy is back to a higher level of employment.
For evidence of more positive effects of training programs in periods of high unemployment
rates see for example Lechner and Wunsch (2009a) and Heinrich and Mueser (2015). In line
with this, Forslund, Fredriksson, and Vikström (2011) argue that programs with strong locking-
in effects should be rather used in an economic downturn, because the cost of forgoing search
time is lower than in an economic upturn.
These considerations are particularly relevant if the economy is not only characterized by
high job destruction rates but also undergoes a major structural change. Structural change often
involves depreciation of human capital. For the unemployed who are not able to use, for ex-
ample, learning-on-the-job to stop the depreciation, JCSs might be a particularly helpful instru-
ment. Consequently, JCSs have quite some leverage to improve the situation of the participants.
This leverage might depend on the level of the human capital. Dynamic complementarities in
human capital on which the recent literature focuses (see for example Almlund, Duckworth,
Heckman, and Kautz (2011)) mean in this context that high skilled individuals might be partic-
ularly affected by depreciation and in turn might be able to benefit most from participation in
JCSs.
There exist a number of empirical studies evaluating the employment effects of JCSs for
stable, rather matured market economies.2 The general notion is that JCSs do not have positive
effects. However, there are some signs for effect heterogeneity. Some papers conclude that
long-term unemployed gain from participation in JCSs, whereas others not (see for example
Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2008a) vs. Hujer and Thomsen (2010)). Quite stable results
exist with respect to positive effects for hard-to-place3 women in West-Germany (Caliendo,
Hujer, and Thomsen (2008b) and Hohmeyer and Wolff (2012)). Note that only a small number
of these studies investigate whether there is effect heterogeneity with respect to educational
level. Those who do distinguish by education level do not find significant differences between
different educational levels (see for example Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2008b)).
The state of evidence is different for economies that underwent a major shock, as it was
the case during the transformation process. There exist only few studies that evaluate the em-
ployment effects of JCSs and those come to rather diverse results. Concerning the impact of
JCSs in East Germany for the period after the reunification, Hübler (1997) and Kraus, Puhani,
and Steiner (2000) conclude that JCSs have a rather negative impact on the employment prob-
2See for example Cockx and Ridder (2001) for Belgium, Bonnal, Fougère, and Sérandon (1997) for France,
Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller (2008) for Switzerland and for Germany Hohmeyer and Wolff (2012) and
Lechner and Wunsch (2009b) as well as the series of papers using an administrative sample of unemployed in
2000 (see Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004), Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2006), Hujer and Zeiss (2007),
Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2008a), Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2008b), Hujer and Thomsen (2010)). For
overview studies see for example Bergemann and van den Berg (2008) and Card, Kluve, and Weber (2010).
3Measured for example by a high number of unsuccessful placement propositions or dependency on welfare
benefits.
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ability of the participants, while Eichler and Lechner (2002) find a substantial decline in the
unemployment probability due to participation in JCSs in the period after program end.
The evidence is similarly scarce when considering other transformation countries. One
exception is Lubyova and van Ours (1999), who evaluate JCSs for the time from 1991 to 1996 in
Slovakia. They find positive effects on the job finding probability for JCSs in the public sector,
while JCSs in the private sector that typically had a longer duration seem to reduce the exit rate
to regular work. In a related paper, van Ours (2004) finds evidence that part of the difference
in the effects are driven by locking-in effects of JCSs, and that those are stronger for men than
for women. Kluve, Lehmann, and Schmidt (1999) study the effects of different ALMPs in
the period from 1992 to 1996 in Poland and they find evidence for reduced employment rates
mainly among male participants in JCSs.4 None of these studies investigates whether the effects
differ by level of human capital.
A remarkable result of many studies on JCSs, independent of whether JCSs are taking place
in stable or turbulent economies, is that women benefit more than men. This seems to be
particularly the case in countries with a high female labor force participation. In their overview
article, Bergemann and van den Berg (2008) argue that participation in JCSs might help to
overcome statistical discrimination.
As mentioned, our paper, in line with the focus of the existing literature, concentrates on the
main official objective of JCSs namely to evaluate whether participation increases the employ-
ment prospects of its participants. It should however be pointed out that with the provision of
JCSs additional objectives were pursued. Firstly, JCSs should also provide immediate employ-
ment opportunities and income for the unemployed individuals during this period of massive
job destruction and a persistent deficit of productive employment opportunities. In this way
it was used as a tool for raising the overall number of jobs in the economy. A further claim
of at least part of the JCSs in East Germany was to invest in the East German infrastructure.
Therewith, the program might have stabilized the income of a large number of individuals and
their families during the transformation process, while participants carried out work which is
potentially valuable for the society. An exhaustive evaluation of this kind of programs should
take these aspects into account.
Our analysis is based on the Labor Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt (LMM–SA), which
is a survey on the working age population of the East German state of Sachsen–Anhalt. We
use the last three waves (1997, 1998, 1999) of the survey, which include retrospective monthly
calendars on the complete labor market history, including participation in ALMP programs
since the reunification. This calendar offers unique possibilities for the empirical analysis of
program participation in the years after the German reunification. Our observation period starts
in 1990, shortly before the reunification, and ends in 1999.
4Based on Polish data Puhani (2002) presents similar findings applying matching estimators. His findings
based on duration models indicate significantly negative effects for men and women. However, the estimated
specifications are very restrictive. For example, he does not control for selection into the treatment and the models
assume a homogenous treatment effect over time spent in unemployment.
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The program was in place in all regions in the state of Sachsen–Anhalt, and the data does
not contain instrumental variables which could be used to identify causal effects. We therefore
estimate discrete time duration models following the timing-of-events approach (Abbring and
van den Berg (2003)). This approach allows to control for dynamic selection into the treatment
based on both observed and unobserved characteristics. We estimate the impact of JCSs on the
probability of finding a job and on the probability of retaining employment. This approach has
two major advantages in particular in view of evaluating a program in an unstable economy.
Firstly, the way we allow for unobserved heterogeneity does not require controlling for past
employment outcomes or using past employment outcomes in order to estimate differences-in-
differences (as e.g. Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2008a) or Eichler and Lechner (2002)).
Besides a lack of availability of detailed data on employment histories before 1990, this type
of data might contain relatively little information for the prediction of future outcomes in our
observation period. The unemployment rate in the socialistic German Democratic Republic
(GDR) was close to zero and a large share of the human capital lost its value during the trans-
formation process. Therefore, our application using the timing-of-events approach delivers new
insights into the effectiveness of JCSs.
The second major advantage of our approach is the focus on transition rates. This takes
automatically into account that the program does not take place in a stationary environment.
Bergemann, Fitzenberger, and Speckesser (2009) show for the case of training in East Germany
that using transition rates as success indicator is more appropriate in such a nonstationary en-
vironment as compared to the use of unconditional employment rates as it is often done in the
literature. Furthermore, estimating the effects on transition rates is more informative because
they deliver detailed information about the functioning of JCSs; notably, whether the program
helps participants to find a regular job and whether the program helps to stay in a regular job.
This is particularly interesting for the German case, as the regulatory framework sets down that
JCSs should help to improve the employment situation notably in these two dimensions.
The studies closest to ours are van Ours (2004) and Eichler and Lechner (2002). Eichler and
Lechner (2002) evaluate the effectiveness of JCSs in Sachsen-Anhalt for the time period 1992
to 1996 based, as the present analysis, on data of the LMM-SA. The authors do not exploit the
monthly retrospective calendar but the panel structure of the data using the waves from 1992 to
1997. In this way they can only identify labor market states at the time of the interviews. Eich-
ler and Lechner (2002) apply a conditional difference–in–differences approach with the unem-
ployment probability as the outcome variable of interest. The estimator is aligned on the labor
market state observed directly before the participation. This can affect their estimates if the
employment situation is characterized by a temporary (random) deterioration (a phenomenon
that is also captured under the heading Ashenfelter’s Dip following Ashenfelter (1978)); this
randomness in the employment situation is automatically captured in our transition rate model.
Moreover, our timing-of-events approach is able to take into account that individuals might en-
ter the programs at a later point in time. An additional innovation constitutes our focus on effect
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heterogeneity beyond gender, which is able to deliver new insides on the functioning of JCSs.
The evaluation of van Ours (2004) also builds upon the timing-of-events approach, but he
solely focuses on the transition rate to work. Moreover, he investigates effect heterogeneity
only with respect to gender. We investigate effect heterogeneity with respect to selected fur-
ther characteristics like education, and estimate models allowing for effect heterogeneity with
respect to unobserved characteristics following Richardson and van den Berg (2013). Addition-
ally, we estimate specifications controlling for endogenous participation in training programs
and investigate the effects of multiple treatments.
Our results suggest strong negative locking-in effects during program participation. These
effects are in line with the intention to provide job opportunities for the unemployed, and might
at least partly reflect a rearrangement of the job queue. In a model with homogeneous treatment
effects, the negative treatment effect vanishes one year after the program start. Furthermore,
we show that women and highly skilled participants leave unemployment quicker than other
groups, which results in highly skilled women benefiting from participation. Additional results
suggest that JCSs do not influence employment stability.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the East German labor
market situation and the institutional settings of JCSs. Section 3 presents the data and descrip-
tive statistics. Section 4 specifies the empirical model and discusses the underlying assumptions.
Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis and Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Economic Development in East Germany
On the eve of the German reunification in 1990, the economic situation in East Germany was
quite desolate. The centrally planned economy of the GDR was characterized by inefficient
production processes, obsolete technologies and over-staffing. Following a policy of full em-
ployment, the GDR had a labor force of about 10 million in 1989 and unemployment was almost
nonexistent. In contrast, the modern market-oriented economy of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many had a labor force of about 28 million and a rate of registered unemployment of 7.9% in
1989 (Federal Employment Agency (1990)).5
In this new environment existing East German firms faced enormous difficulties to com-
pete. They could rarely cover their variable costs at the prevailing market prizes. In addition,
their former home market broke away as East Germans diverted their spending towards West
German products. Production in 1991 only reached two-thirds of its 1989 level. Four years of
high growth rates followed in East Germany. However, since 1996 the economy was basically
stagnating again.
5For more detailed information on the economic development of East Germany see von Hagen, Strauch, and
Wolff (2002), Burda and Hunt (2001) and Wunsch (2005).
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The government reacted with setting up large labor market programs in order to cushion
the effects of economic restructuring. Shortly after the reunification the main emphasis was
put on instruments that were easy to implement. Short-time work and early retirement schemes
were predominant. However, already in 1991, a substantial part of the East German labor force
participated in active labor market programs to keep the official unemployment rate - which does
not include program participants - from skyrocketing. By correcting the number of unemployed
by the number of participants in ALMP programs, adjusted unemployment rates (also called
underemployment rates) in East Germany amounted to 25.3% in 1991, peaked at 35.3% in
1992 and decreased to a value of 23.7% in 1999 (see Table 1). In 1991, 209,000 individuals
participated in JCSs and 280,000 in training programs. Participation in ALMP measures peaked
in 1992 with over 800,000 individuals participating on average in full-time programs. From
1993 onwards, the number of participants began to shrink due to policy changes and financial
restrictions. However, training and JCSs remain important components of policy interventions
in East Germany until the early 2000s.
Despite the heavy use of ALMPs, unemployment increased drastically. During the period
1990-1992, regular employment was reduced from a yearly average of over 9 million jobs down
to just under 6 million jobs and the unemployment rate rose from virtually zero in 1990 to
more than 10% in 1991. From 1991 onwards, it exceeded the average unemployment rate for
Germany as a whole (see Figure 1).
Our analysis is based on data gathered in the new federal state of Sachen-Anhalt. In 1999,
2.7 million individuals lived in Sachsen-Anhalt which corresponds to 3% of the population in
Germany and to 22% of the population of the new federal states without Berlin (Federal Statis-
tical Office (2015)). Figure 1 shows that the unemployment rate in Sachsen-Anhalt exceeded
the average of East Germany over the whole observation period. These figures were mainly
driven by the high concentration of sectors like agriculture, electrical industry, trade, mining
and chemical industry. After reunification, many companies in these fields had to close down
due to the loss of trading partners in the East and inefficient production processes.
A factor that should not be neglected when discussing the economic situation in East Ger-
many is the emigration that set in after the fall of the wall. In 1989 and 1990 almost 400,000
individuals, which is about 2% of the East German population, migrated from East to West Ger-
many each year (Kröhnert and Skipper (2010)). The threat of mass emigration was a popular
argument for a quick catch-up of East German wages and for an implementation of large ALMP
programs among both politicians and union leaders. Indeed, the migration situation changed af-
ter 1990. Emigration reduced substantially and was increasingly matched by immigrating West
Germans. In 1997, East-West migration reached a minimum with 13,000 individuals. Since
then, emigration from the new federal states has increased again.
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rate in Germany 1991–1999
Source: Federal Employment Agency (2017).
2.2 Background and Aims of JCSs
When the West German Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, AFG) was
transferred to East Germany a number of additional regulations were introduced to take into
account the special situation of the East German economy. Those exceptions meant, among
others, less restrictive rules for participation in ALMP programs shortly after reunification. In
the following section, we describe the eligibility rules and some important implementation de-
tails of the two different job creation programs which were realized in East Germany. We focus
on the institutional regulations in force during the time before the Employment Promotion Act
was replaced by the new Social Law Book III in 1998. This time period covers the main part of
our observation period.6
In this study, the phrase job creation scheme includes two different types of programs which
were realized in East Germany after the reunification: traditional JCSs (Allgemeine Maßnah-
men zur Arbeitsbeschaffung, see §§91-96 AFG) and Productive Wage Subsidies East (Produk-
tive Lohnkostenzuschüsse Ost, see §249h AFG).7 The latter were introduced in January 1993
and offered temporary employment opportunities in activity areas like social services or envi-
ronmental redevelopment. Both job creation programs intended to create additional temporary
jobs primarily in the public or nonprofit sector for the time of the subsidy and were similarly
handled by the labor offices. They differed, however, with respect to the level of the subsidy,
the program duration and the activity areas.
6Further information and data on JCSs in East Germany in the early 1990s can be found for example in
Brinkmann and Völkel (1992) and Spitznagel (1992). Only few additional changes concerning JCSs took place
with the introduction of SGB III, see for example Wunsch (2005).
7In 1998 these subsidies were renamed to Structural Adjustment Measures (Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen).
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The government pursued several objectives by implementing JCSs in East Germany in the
period after reunification. First, in the course of the transformation process, JCSs should simply
provide jobs and income for unemployed individuals and those who were at risk of becoming
unemployed. In this way the threat of social hardship could be reduced and the official unem-
ployment rate could be lowered. Second, they were used as means to invest in the East German
industrial infrastructure. Especially in the time of 1993–1996, this aim was emphasized by the
large scale provision of ordinary productive wage subsidies with their restricted activity areas.
The third objective, which constituted the main official aim (Wolfinger and Brinkmann (1996)),
was in accordance with the traditional role of ALMP measures: the employment subsidies
should help the participants to find regular jobs. Indeed, over time the focus nearly completely
shifted towards this goal. In addition, the AFG emphasized that especially those JCSs should be
supported which help creating stable employment relationships. This paper evaluates whether
JCSs help to find and retain regular employment. Hereby, traditional JCSs and ordinary subsi-
dies will be jointly evaluated. Unfortunately, data limitations make it impossible to distinguish
between these two different program types (see Section 3.1).
2.3 Institutional Provisions of JCSs
The implementation of the two types of JCSs involved the following steps. A project orga-
nizing institution, which could be a firm, a public authority or a charity, had to create at least
one job within a project. This project needed to be beneficial for the community and had
to be additional in the sense that it would not be carried out without the subsidy. Formally,
after approval of a project, the local labor office should choose the participants. Surveys in
labor offices showed that the time elapsing between the application of a project organizing in-
stitution and the actual program start was on average three months (Völkel (1994)). In East
Germany so-called “Societies for Employment Promotion and Structural Development” (ABS-
Gesellschaften) often acted as large scale organizers of JCSs. In the early 90s these societies
had a significant influence on the selection of participants. They had a preference for young
educated men (Brinkmann and Völkel (1992)).
Participation in a JCS was often financially attractive for unemployed individuals. The wage
paid during program participation had to be equal to the wage set by collective wage agreements
between the unions and employers organizations for similar but unsubsidized work (Tariflohn).
The subsidy given to the employer covered part of (or fully) the wage costs. Participants re-
ceived a fixed-term work contract, which induced regular social security contributions. As a
consequence the participant renewed or prolonged his or her eligibility period for unemploy-
ment benefits. During participation the local labor office and the participant should continue
their search for a regular job. The program ended in case a regular job or a suitable training pro-
gram was found. More recently, JCSs can be used to test the willingness to work of unemployed
jobseekers in Germany, see for example Hohmeyer and Wolff (2012), who study the impact of
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JCSs on German welfare recipients based on a sample from 2005. In our context, with high job
destruction rates and low job offer arrival rates, the test of willingness to work was, however,
neither an explicit nor implicit goal of JCSs (see for example Spitznagel (1992)). Moreover, the
increased income compared to unemployment benefit payments made participation in JCSs for
most of the unemployed job seekers attractive.
The length of traditional JCSs was typically 12 months. In some cases extensions of up to 24
months or even of up to 36 months were possible if a permanent job was offered subsequently
by the organizer of JCSs. Productive Wage Subsidies East could be granted even longer. It
can be granted up to 48 months for employees that are older than 50, handicapped people or
in case a permanent job was offered by the program-supporting employer. The subsidy is not
transferable to other employers. It is exclusively paid to the employer who set up the JCS.
The implementation details depended on the type of the subsidy program and the point
in time it took place. Formally, participation in traditional JCSs required that the person was
unemployed and entitled to some kind of unemployment payment just prior to participation.
In addition, a person needed to have been unemployed for at least 6 months within the last 12
months. The eligibility criteria for Productive Wage Subsidies East were less strict. Besides
being eligible for some kind of allowance, a participant needed to have been unemployed for 3
months, or needed to have had finished a traditional JCS, or enter from short-time work.
The local labor offices could depart from the above mentioned participation criteria. In
particular, the rules with respect to the previous unemployment duration have not been applied
strictly in East Germany. This is especially true for the period directly after the unification. Also
shortly after the unification, it was common practice after plant’s closure to collectively put the
work force of the plant into a so-called Mega-JCS. This program involved, for example, closing
down the obsolete plant or cleaning-up the environmental damage produced by the plant. We
do not consider participation in Mega-JCSs in our main specification as these programs are not
primarily aiming at the integration into regular employment.
This practice and the influence of the large scale ABS-Societies on the selection of par-
ticipants were the main reasons for the deviations from the target group of traditional JCSs.
Unemployed older than 50 or younger than 25 and without professional education, long-term
unemployed and, as a special regulation for East Germany, also women belonged to the target
group. It should be mentioned that for older participants an additional small scale job creation
program existed. Albeit being similar to traditional JCSs this program solely intended to bridge
the time until retirement (Maßnahmen zur Arbeitsbeschaffung für ältere Arbeitslose §§97-99
AFG). In order to avoid the analysis of pre-retirement effects, we will exclude elderly from our
analysis (see Section 3.1). In the mid 90s, the allocation of JCSs became more in line with the
predefined target groups.
In April 1997 an additional productive wage subsidies program was implemented: Pro-
ductive Wage Subsidy for Business Enterprises (Lohnkostenzuschüsse Ost für Wirtschaftsun-
ternehmen, see §249h AFG) which was designed to subsidize temporarily regular jobs. This
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program of ALMP will not be considered here as it might have qualitatively different effects
from JCSs.
2.4 Participation and Costs of JCSs
Table 1 shows that the number of program participants peaked in 1992 when 388,000 individuals
were employed in traditional JCSs in the new federal states (NFS). In this time period high
participation rates were mainly realized by Mega-JCSs, where the workforce of closing firms
were collectively put into a job creation program. Thereafter, policy changes and financial
restrictions led to decreasing yearly stocks. Between 1993 and 1997 the stock of participants in
traditional JCSs fluctuated around 200,000 while the stock of participants in Productive Wage
Subsidies East fluctuated around 90,000 per year in East Germany. From 1998 onwards, the
number of jobs created via traditional JCSs was lower than the number created via Productive
Wage Subsidies East. This development was mainly driven by the introduction of the Productive
Wage Subsidies for Business Enterprises in April 1997.
Table 1: Participants in JCSs (in thousands), 1991-1999
Year Traditional JCSs Productive Wage Underemployment Rates
Subsidies East in %
NFS SA SANFS(in%) NFS SA
SA
NFS(in%) NFS SA
1991 208.7 35.7 17.1 . . . 25.3 24.8
1992 388.1 88.0 22.7 . . . 35.3 37.3
1993 237.5 56.4 23.7 22.5 . . 32.3 34.4
1994 192.5 40.0 20.8 87.7 21.0 24.0 29.7 30.3
1995 205.8 41.0 19.9 106.5 23.2 21.8 26.4 27.6
1996 191.5 40.0 20.9 86.2 17.6 20.4 24.2 27.2
1997 154.5 33.0 21.4 80.1 17.1 21.4 24.0 27.0
1998 151.8 27.0 17.8 162.4 29.5 18.2 24.1 26.7
1999 168.0 30.0 17.9 180.0 29.0 16.1 23.7 26.6
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. SA: Sachsen-Anhalt. NFS: New federal states including East Berlin. Under-
employment = unemployed + full-time equivalents of short-time work + training participants + JCS participants
+ early retirement participants. Underemployment rate = underemployment in % of labor force (employed and
unemployed) + training participants + early retirement participants (see the official definitions of the underem-
ployment rate of the Federal Employment Agency (1992-2000)).
Source: Federal Employment Agency (1992-2000), Institute for Employment Research (IAB) (2003).
The relatively high unemployment rate in Sachsen-Anhalt compared to the other new federal
states (see Figure 1) did not result in a higher share of participants in JCSs in the 90s. The
number of participants in JCSs in Sachsen-Anhalt amounted to 20% of the total number of
participants in all new federal states in the time period considered for both kinds of job creation
measures.
Table 2 shows that the expenditures on JCSs by the German Federal Employment Agency
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Table 2: Expenditures on JCSs by the German Federal Employment Agency
(in million DM), 1991-1999
Year NFS SA SANFS(in%)
1991 3075 612 20
1992 5083 1664 33
1993 6905 1388 20
1994 4722 1680 36
1995 7109 1734 24
1996 8156 1701 21
1997 6703 1422 21
1998 5453 1054 19
1999 5681 1117 20
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. SA: Sachsen-Anhalt. NFS: New federal states including East Berlin.
Source: Federal Employment Agency (1992-2000).
for both kinds of programs fluctuate around 5 billion DM (3.7 billione in 2015 prices) and
reached an all-time high in 1996 when costs amounted to more than 8 billion DM (6.0 billione
in 2015 prices) in East Germany. In total, JCSs counted more than 2.5 million participants and
produced expenditures of more than 52 billion DM (39.0 billione in 2015 prices) in the period
1991-1999 in East Germany.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data Set and Sample Selection
The data used stem from the last three years (1997-1999) of the Labor Market Monitor Sachsen-
Anhalt (LMM-SA). The LMM-SA is a survey of the working-age population living in the new
federal state of Sachsen-Anhalt with around 6.000 survey participants each year.8
Similar to other surveys, the LMM-SA provides individual information on socio-economic
characteristics like age and professional education. As an important innovation, the LMM–SA
introduced in the years 1997-1999 a retrospective monthly employment calendar that goes back
until 1990, enabling us to analyze JCSs over a long time period after the reunification.
Recall data over such a long time span can suffer from recall errors. Paull (2002) documents
the international evidence. Due to recall error she notes a tendency to report too many labor
market transitions and at the same time to underreport short unemployment spells. However,
Bachmann and Schaffner (2009) find on the basis of retrospective surveys going back at most
two years that this is less of a problem for the German survey GSOEP.
8The response rate of 32% (Ketzmerik and Wiener (1999)) is in line with other innovative surveys. For example
the response rate of the German Internet Panel amounts to 19% (Blom, Gathmann, and Krieger (2015)), and the
response rate of the GSOEP innovation refreshment sample F to 51% (Däubler (2002)).
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Although our survey covers a longer time span, we argue that the set-up of the questionnaire
is such that our data also suffers less from recall error compared to other data recording simi-
larly long time periods. Firstly, the survey participants are asked to remember their employment
history starting with the historic year of 1990, in which the political and economic system of
East Germany changed drastically. The accuracy of recall can be strongly improved by such
a combination of biographic and historic events (Loftus and Marburger (1983)). Second, the
data is collected in a chronological order, which is regarded as the best technique for collect-
ing life history data in a single survey (Sudman and Bradburn (1973)). Furthermore, we try
to use broadly defined labor market states, such that recall errors can cancel out. This is par-
ticularly relevant for the definition of the ‘out of the labor market’ state and ‘unemployment’.
Paull (2002) for example finds that women tend to redefine unemployment to being ‘out of the
labor force’. In our main analysis we aggregate these two states to being ‘unemployed’. The
aggregation is supported by the observation that being ‘out of the labor force’ is a rare event
in East Germany for prime aged individuals. Labor force participation is historically very high
in East Germany. However, we also present a sensitivity analysis where the ‘out of the labor
force’ state is treated as a censoring event. One potential problem with our data could be that
some JCSs are reported as regular employment. This is comparable to the tendency that private
training programs are reported as ALMP training programs, see Ketzmerik (2001). However,
we do not have a benchmark data set with which we can investigate this issue. As long as this
is not systematically related to the success of the program this should not bias our results.
Our data source allows us to distinguish the following combined categories of the labor
market status on a monthly basis: in education, employed (including full-time employed, part-
time employed and self-employed), unemployed (combined with out of the labor force), in
training, in JCS, in maternal leave and in retirement.9
Our sample focuses on individuals that are between 25 and 50 years old in January 1990
and that had been employed before the Monetary, Economic and Social Union went into effect
in June 1990. This allows us to analyze the effect of JCSs for individuals who belonged to the
active labor force of the GDR and who were hence fully affected by the transformation process
and subsequent introduction of ALMP programs.10 At the same time, this sampling criteria
allows us to exclude individuals who are close to retirement and might use ALMP programs as
a bridge to retirement.
Table A.2 in the Appendix presents an overview of the variables used in this study. Based on
these data we construct a sample of inflows into unemployment based on individuals whose la-
bor market history is observable until at least September 1997 without interruption. We consider
9For more details on the data set and its use see for example Bergemann, Fitzenberger, and Speckesser (2009)
and Ketzmerik (2001) as well as Eichler and Lechner (2002) on earlier waves.
10See Table A.1 for the number of observations dropped by each sample selection step. Note that the data
collecting institute provided us with a retrospective questionnaire data set, where already only those were selected
who gave a full account of their employment history; these were about 95% of all interviewees, see Ketzmerik and
Wiener (1999).
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unemployment spells starting in January 1991 or later only if there exists a prior employment
spell of at least one month.11
This analysis exploits information on 2,235 individuals who experience at least one un-
employment spell between January 1991 and the end of the observation period, which can be
September 1997, October 1998 or December 1999.12 In total, the data include 3,864 unem-
ployment spells. Thus, several individuals experience multiple spells and the average number
of spells per individual amounts to 1.7. Transitions to other destinations than to employment are
treated as right censored. Thus, if an individual enters an alternative ALMP program like train-
ing before finding regular employment, the spell is also considered as censored at the point in
time the individual enters the alternative program. As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate a model
with endogenous right-censoring. In this specification, we model transitions to other states than
employment as a competing risk. We additionally estimate specifications in which we define
periods of training participation as unemployment and models in which we consider participa-
tion in training programs as an alternative treatment. For these specifications, unemployment
continues during training participation. Moreover, unemployment spells are right censored in
case the observation period ends before an exit out of unemployment can be observed.
In case of treatment, we observe the exact moment of the entry into the program and the
actual program duration. However, we do not have any information on the planned partici-
pation duration in a JCS. In our model specifications, the time spent in a JCS is assumed to
contribute to the unemployment duration. Although program participants may search for a job
with reduced effort, they still do search, hence they should be treated as unemployed. In our
main specification, an unemployment spell is defined as right censored at the moment a second
entry into JCSs is observed. We additionally estimate specifications which model the selection
into the second treatment and which estimate a corresponding additional treatment effect.
The phrase job creation schemes (JCSs) includes all variants of public employment pro-
grams, although they are partly conceptually different, as mentioned in Section 2.2. As it is
unclear whether programs starting after April 1997 are JCSs or productive wage subsidies for
regular jobs, we will only use information on program participation that started before April
1997 and treat entries after April 1997 as right censored. The baseline specification of the anal-
ysis excludes participants in Mega-JCSs, identified as those individuals who enter the program
directly after employment. We find a high concentration of Mega-JCSs in Sachsen-Anhalt in
the early 90s. In 193 cases a direct transition from employment to a JCS can be observed. In a
sensitivity analysis we are going to investigate the effects of both traditional and Mega-JCSs.
11Due to data restrictions on the local unemployment rates that are included as controls in the analysis, we have
to exclude unemployment spells starting before January 1991.
12We also consider persons as unemployed if they indicated to be in a training program for at most 1 month.
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3.2 Labor Market Transitions and Durations
We observe that around 11% of the unemployment spells include a period of participation in a
JCS (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). About half of the spells without treatment and 26% of the
spells with treatment end in a transition into regular employment. 23% of the unemployment
spells that are observed to include participation in a JCS are followed by a period of participation
in a training program and 16% are followed by a second participation in JCSs. For 23% no
transition can be observed within the observation period.
Figures 2 and 3 present non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rates based
on information of the first unemployment spell. Figure 2 contains the empirical exit rate from
unemployment into regular employment which is highest at the beginning of the unemploy-
ment spell and then starts to decline. After a second peak at an unemployment duration of 12
months which could be caused by the expiration of unemployment benefits, the exit rate circu-
lates around 1.5%. The conditional probability of entering a JCS increases to a level of around
2.3% after one year of unemployment. In the subsequent period the hazard rate has a slight
positive trend. Figure 3 shows the empirical exit rate from the program to unemployment and
employment, respectively. Both plots reveal strong peaks at 12 and 24 months indicating that a
substantial share of participants re-enters unemployment and some participants enter employ-
ment directly after the program has expired.13 Moreover, the right panel in Figure 3 shows that
the transition rate to employment during program participation is - especially during the first 11
months - rather low, which suggests that a vast majority stays in the JCS until the end of the
contract.
Figure 2: Transition from Unemployment to Employment and to Job Creation Schemes
Notes: Empirical exit rates are based on the first unemployment spell.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
A JCS typically lasts 12 months. The left panel in Figure 4 shows that around 40% of
all JCSs end after one year and only a few last longer than 24 months. The peaks at 12
13Table A.4 in the Appendix presents summary statistics of the duration of unemployment, of subsequent em-
ployment and of JCSs separately for spells that end with a transition to employment, spells that end with a transition
to another labor market state and right censored spells due to the end of the observation period.
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Figure 3: Transition from Job Creation Scheme to (Un)employment
Notes: Empirical exit rates are based on the first unemployment spell.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
and 24 months indicate that many individuals exploit the program to the full extent which
can be interpreted as a sign of locking-in effects. The right panel in Figure 4 displays
the distribution of the moment of the program start in the sample of treated individuals.
While the largest share of individuals enters the program after exactly 12 months in unem-
ployment (around 8% of all program participants), we have rather equal shares of entries
ranging from 3% to 6% in the first 11 months. The distribution of program timing and the
transition probabilities from unemployment to JCSs over time shown in Figure 2 underline
that we face a dynamic treatment setting with possible entries over the full unemployment spell.
Figure 4: Distribution of Program Duration and Unemployment Duration before Program Start
Notes: The distribution of program durations (left panel) is based on treated individuals for whom the duration is
completely observable.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Observable Characteristics
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the observed covariates for all individuals and separately
for program participants and nonparticipants. The values of these variables are constant over
the observation period. They are measured at the date of the interview with the exception of age
which refers to the year 1990.
About half of the unemployed in our sample are women. 60% of the unemployed that
participate in a JCS during their first unemployment spell are female. In total, the largest fraction
of unemployed individuals is between 45 and 50 years old in 1990. One third of the program
participants are 45 to 50 years old.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Covariates in %
All Participants Nonparticipants
Ages 25-29 18.1 11.1 19.1
Ages 30-34 19.8 20.6 19.7
Ages 35-39 21.5 18.1 22.0
Ages 40-44 15.7 17.1 15.5
Ages 45-50 24.9 33.1 23.7
Female 52.3 59.6 51.2
Male 47.7 40.4 48.8
No Vocational Training 1.7 4.2 1.3
Partly Vocational Training 2.2 3.1 2.1
Vocational Training 50.9 49.8 51.1
Advanced Vocational Training 7.3 4.9 7.6
Technical College 15.7 16.0 15.7
University Degree 22.2 22.0 22.2
Total 2,235 287 1,948
Notes: Descriptive statistics are based on the first unemployment spell. The highest professional education level is
measured at the interview date. Age is measured in January 1990.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Furthermore, we include a set of dummy variables indicating the professional education
of the unemployed. The comparatively small number of individuals without or with partly
vocational training arises from the obligation to perform a vocational training (Berufsbil-
dungspflicht) in the former GDR. Table 3 shows that about half of the unemployed individ-
uals have achieved a vocational training and one-fifth exhibit a university degree. The share of
unemployed with a high professional education is similar for participants and for nonpartici-
pants.14
14The highest professional education level is measured at the day of the interview. For 14 individuals in our sam-
ple we observe an unemployment spell before individuals reenter the educational system. For those individuals we
adjust the educational level measured at the time of the interview by the time spent in the educational system since
the corresponding unemployment spell. In a robustness check we exclude those individuals from the estimation
sample. The results do not change.
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In addition, the list of covariates included in our estimations contains year and quarter
dummies, regional dummies, monthly unemployment rates by labor market district, and a
time-varying variable capturing the distance from the expiration date of unemployment ben-
efit claims.15
4 Empirical Model
We are interested in the causal impact of entering a JCS on the unemployment duration and sub-
sequent employment stability. Individuals are defined to be treated if they enter a JCS in month
t of the unemployment spell, from the corresponding month t onwards. In this section we start
with the presentation of a bivariate duration model for the duration until leaving unemployment
for a job and the duration until the treatment following the timing-of-events approach (Abbring
and van den Berg (2003)).16 We have monthly information about different employment states
and estimate discrete time duration models. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) provide a proof
for continuous time models (for identification in dynamic discrete models see Heckman and
Navarro (2007)). In a second step we investigate the subsequent employment stability of pro-
gram participants and nonparticipants by introducing a third transition process similar to van
den Berg and Vikström (2014). In addition, we estimate models allowing for a random treat-
ment effect following Richardson and van den Berg (2013) and models with two treatments
(JCSs and training), whereby we allow the probability of entering one treatment to depend on
the participation in another treatment. None of these model extensions leads to different results.
Therefore, in the following we focus on the description of our main econometric model.
Our data set contains multiple unemployment spells for some individuals, which facilitates
identification and estimation of the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity variables
(Honoré (1993)). Moreover, our data set includes time-varying variables such as the local un-
employment rate which provide a more robust source of identification than time-invariant co-
variates (Gaure, Røed, and Zhang (2007)). Lagged time-varying variables act as exclusion
restrictions. They have an impact on the survival probability until a time t, but conditional on
observed and unobserved characteristics lagged values do not have any impact on the transition
probabilities in t. Intuitively, individuals with the same observed characteristics x in period t but
different values of lagged time-varying variables should only have a different transition prob-
ability if the composition with respect to unobserved heterogeneity is different. This has been
pointed out earlier by for example Eberwein, Ham, and LaLonde (1997), and Brinch (2007)
provides a theoretical discussion of identification. Brinch (2007) shows that in the presence of
time-varying covariates mixed hazard rate models are identified without the proportional hazard
15The unemployment rates are corrected for the number of participants in ALMP programs and hence are larger
than the official numbers.
16For a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the approach, see van den Berg and Vikström
(2014).
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rate assumption.
4.1 Durations until Employment and until Treatment
The transition probability of leaving unemployment for a job θu(t) and the probability of en-
tering a JCS θp(t) are assumed to vary with observed characteristics xt , the unobserved hetero-
geneity terms vu and vp, respectively and the elapsed unemployment duration t. Additionally,
the probability of leaving unemployment depends on the treatment status in period t. We as-
sume that the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time, i.e. across repeated spells of
unemployed individuals, and uncorrelated with observed characteristics. θu(t) and θp(t) can be
expressed by complementary log log specifications:
θu(t|x′t ,vu, tp) = 1− exp(−exp(λu(t)+ x′tβu+1(t ≥ tp)δu+ vu) (1)
θp(t|x′t ,vp) = 1− exp(−exp(λp(t)+ x′tβp+ vp)) (2)
λu(t) and λp(t) capture the duration dependencies and the vectors βu and βp capture the
influence of observed covariates. δu corresponds to the effect of being treated on the probability
of finding a job. The treatment effect might vary depending on the time since the treatment.
In our baseline model, we allow for a time-varying treatment effect by specifying two intervals
following the start of the treatment in period tp: (tp ≤ t ≤ tp+c1) and (t > tp+c1). The hazard
rate is shifted by δu1 in the first c1 months after program start. After a program duration of c1
months, the hazard rate is shifted by δu2 . We additionally estimate models with more than two
time intervals for the treatment effect, models allowing for effect heterogeneity with respect to
selected observed characteristics, and models with treatment effects depending on the point in
time the treatment starts.
As described in Subsection 2.3, eligibility for program participation requires in principle at
least 3-6 months of unemployment experience. These rules have not been applied strictly in
East Germany, and, consequently, we observe in our data quite some transitions into the JCS
although individuals have not been eligible with respect to the criterion based on the previous
unemployment duration (53 cases). Nonetheless, these rules might introduce shifts in the haz-
ard rates depending on the eligibility. Therefore, we include two additional dummy variables
indicating the non-eligibility according to these rules. The first dummy variable is relevant for
the years 1991 and 1992. From 1993 onwards, depending on the program scheme, individu-
als should have been at least 6 months unemployed in the previous 12 months or their current
unemployment spell should have lasted for at least 3 months. We include a second dummy
variable for this period which is one if the stricter criterion of 6 months is not fulfilled.17
17We additionally estimate models with two dummies for the period from 1993 onwards, to capture the differ-
ential rules for the two programs, and we allow for some observed characteristics to have differential effects on
the transition probability to JCSs if individuals are not eligible based on the unemployment criterion. The latter
specification captures potential non-proportionalities due to the eligibility rules in a flexible way. These alternative
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For identification – similar to alternative micro-econometric approaches like matching – it
is important that the unemployed job seekers do not anticipate the exact moment a JCS starts.
This no-anticipation assumption implies that the future realization of the moment of entry into
treatment does not affect the probability of leaving unemployment for a job before the moment
the treatment starts.18 It is likely that this assumption holds in our context. As discussed in Sub-
section 2.3, the case worker decides about participation. He or she has to place his candidates
as early as possible and has to check potential alternative job offers. Moreover, the gap between
program admission and actual start of the program is rather small. Surveys among caseworkers
indicate that the time span between the application of an employer for funding of the JCS and
the actual program start was on average three months (Völkel (1994)). Hence, the time span
between the point in time the individuals are informed about program start and actual program
start should be on average less than three months. The no-anticipation assumption implies that
individuals do not adjust their behavior once they received this information. Richardson and
van den Berg (2013) argue that in a context such as ours where the potential anticipation span is
relatively short compared to the duration of the program (or if the anticipation effects are small)
the estimates are relatively insensitive to this assumption. Note that our framework allows for
ex-ante effects that is ex ante knowledge of the existence of the program and ex ante knowledge
of the individual distribution of time to treatment. One important determinant of the program
participation might be the expiration date of benefit entitlements, since benefit claims can be
prolonged by participation in a JCS. We are able to account for this mechanism by constructing
a variable capturing the distance until the individual expiration date. Moreover, our approach
takes into account the treatment could be given at a later point in time.
It should be pointed out that the treatment effect is defined within an environment where
the ALMP is present. Consequently, as a common shortcoming of microeconometric ALMP
evaluation studies, we cannot capture equilibrium effects (see Crépon and van den Berg (2016)),
i.e. we do not focus on how nonparticipants are affected by the program (for example spillover
effects) and how the effect of participants is influenced by the existence of the program. This
partial approach is motivated by the idea that only if we find positive long-run effects in this
framework, the program can potentially pass a cost-benefit analysis where also equilibrium
effects are considered.
specifications do not change our main results (see Tables S.3 and S.4 in the Supplementary Appendix).
18It is important to note that the no-anticipation assumption does not exclude that individuals know the prob-
ability distribution of future events conditional on observable and unobservable characteristics. Individuals may
change their optimal behavior to determinants of the treatment process, but not to the realizations of future treat-
ments.
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4.2 Employment Stability
We additionally investigate the impact of the treatment on the subsequent employment stability.
The transition probability from employment to unemployment θe(t) can be expressed by:
θe(t|x′t ,ve, tu, tp) = 1− exp(−exp(λe(t)+ x′tβe+1(tu ≥ tp)δe+ γ1tu+ γ2t2u + ve)) (3)
λe(t) captures the duration dependence in employment. The probability of reentering un-
employment depends on observed characteristics xt , unobserved heterogeneity ve, and on the
realized unemployment duration tu. The unobserved characteristics are allowed to be correlated
with the unobserved factors vp and vu. The treatment effect δe captures the impact of program
participation during the previous unemployment spell.
4.3 Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity and Likelihood Function
We specify the joint distribution G of the unobserved heterogeneity terms vu, vp and ve to be
discrete with M support points. The associated probabilities are given by:
Pr(vu = vmu ,vp = v
m
p ,ve = v
m
e ) = pm, f or m = 1, ...,M. (4)
To force the class probabilities to be between zero and one and to sum up to one, we use a
multinomial logit parameterization of the class probabilities
pm =
exp(ωm)
exp(∑Mm=1ωm)
with ω1 = 0, f or m = 1, ...,M. (5)
For a model with M = 2, G would be described by 4 parameters, for M = 3 we estimate 8
parameters, etc. This approach allows for a flexible covariance matrix for the unobserved het-
erogeneity. For similar strategies for modeling the unobserved heterogeneity, see for example
Aitkin (1999), Crépon, Ferracci, Jolivet, and van den Berg (2010) and Caliendo, Künn, and
Uhlendorff (2016). Our model selection with respect to the number of mass points is based on
the bivariate duration model. We increase the number of mass points until we cannot improve
the model fit anymore. The evaluation of the model fit is based on the Akaike Criterion (AIC).
The likelihood contribution of individual i for given vmu ,v
m
p ,v
m
e in period t can be expressed by
lit(xit ,vmu ,v
m
p ,v
m
e ) and the Log-likelihood for the sample with N individuals is given by:
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lnL =
N
∑
i=1
ln
( M
∑
m=1
pm
T
∏
t=1
[lit |xit ,vmu ,vmp ,vme ]
)
(6)
19For the models allowing for random treatment effects we introduce an additional unobserved term vmjcs. For
models taking a second treatment (training participation) into account the model is extend by an additional transi-
tion rate from unemployment to training, which depends on the unobserved term vmt .
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5 Results
We start with presenting the results based on a bivariate duration model consisting of the du-
ration until entry into a JCS and the duration until entry into employment. In the baseline
specification, we specify a treatment effect for the first 11 months after the start of the JCS and
for the period from 12 months onwards after the start of the JCS. The choice of this cut-off
value is motivated by the typical program duration of 12 months and allows us to investigate
potential locking-in effects.20
In a second step we introduce effect heterogeneity with respect to the point in time the treat-
ment starts, the elapsed treatment duration and selected observed characteristics. In a third step
we present results for a model with three equations: the transition rate from unemployment
into the program, from unemployment into employment and from employment back into un-
employment. Fourth, we estimate models with a second treatment, the participation in training
programs. Next, we allow for effect heterogeneity with respect to unobserved heterogeneity
(random treatment effects) and investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to differ-
ent choices about the definition of the sample, the unemployment state and about the way we
deal with repeated spells of unemployment and shared unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we
investigate whether a model allowing for endogenous right-censoring leads to different results.
5.1 Baseline Results
We start with a discussion of the model selection in terms of the number of mass points for the
heterogeneity components. This selection is based on a comparison of the model fit. We in-
crease successively the number of mass points until we cannot improve the model fit, evaluated
on basis of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), anymore. In our application, the smallest value of the AIC and the BIC is reached in
the specification with three unobserved mass points (see Table B.1 in the Appendix). In com-
parison to the model without unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate in this specification six
additional parameters for the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.21 For the different tran-
sition processes we choose a flexible specification of the duration dependence based on eight
time intervals.
20This choice is linked to the construction of our dependent variable. The dependent variable for a transition
from unemployment to employment equals one in the last month of the unemployment spell if an individual starts
working in the next month. In this way, we are able to estimate the probability for a transition from unemployment
to employment in every month of the unemployment spell. This means if a direct transition to regular employment
occurs after 12 months of participation in a JCS, the dependent variable equals one in month 12 after program
start. Hence, the specification of the treatment effect for the first 11 months and after 11 months after program start
captures the potential locking-in effects of a JCS with a typical duration of 12 months.
21Figure B.1 in the Appendix presents the empirical exit rate from unemployment to work during the first
unemployment spell jointly for program participants and nonparticipants and additionally the predicted monthly
transition rates based on the estimated parameters. The predicted hazard rate fits well with the average of the
empirical hazard rate and does a good job of describing the duration dependence.
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In Table 4 we present the parameter estimates for the baseline model. The correlation be-
tween the unobserved heterogeneity terms vp and vu is -0.43. This negative correlation implies
that we have a negative selection into treatment based on unobservables: individuals that are
more likely to participate in a JCS, are in general less likely to find a job. However, with a
standard error of 0.49 this negative correlation is not statistically significant from zero.
The main parameters of interest are the treatment effects of entering a JCS depending on
the time since program start. In the first 11 months since start of the program, the estimated
coefficient is with -1.23 negative and significant. This effect states that the transition rate to em-
ployment is reduced by 71% (exp(−1.23)−1) in the first 11 months after start of participation.
From month 12 after program start onwards, the treatment effect vanishes. This result indicates
that locking-in effects seem to be important. During program participation, the job finding
probability is significantly reduced and after a typical program duration of 12 months the ef-
fect becomes positive but insignificant. This positive but insignificant effect after 12 months
might capture both the post-program effect and the negative locking-in effect for those whose
contract has not been expired yet. It points into the direction that JCSs can be beneficial for the
participants.
As laid out in Section 4.1 our approach does not take into account equilibrium effects. Re-
cent papers have shown that spillover effects can for example be important in the context of
job search and training programs, see Crépon et al. (2013), Ferraci, Jolivet, and van den Berg
(2014) and Gautier et al. (2017). Helping some job seekers in their search for jobs through
specific programs might decrease the probabilities of those unemployed who do not participate
in the program. Crépon et al. (2013) provide evidence that these spillover effects are larger in
weak labor markets with high unemployment rates. Given the scale of the JCSs and the state
of the economy during our observation period, the estimated effects might at least partly reflect
spillover effects. This might be especially relevant during participation in the JCSs, i.e. when
the locking-in effects appear. In contrast to the spillover effects of job search programs, the
spillover effects during participation in JCSs are positive for the nonparticipants. As mentioned
in Section 2.3, participation in JCSs was attractive, not only due to the human capital accumu-
lation but also due to the high wages. This attractiveness leads to a reduction in the job search
effort. The resulting reduced job finding probability during program participation might then
go along with increasing employment prospects on the regular labor market for nonparticipants.
These potential effects are not captured by our econometric approach. But we have to keep in
mind that the locking-in effects can at least partly reflect a rearrangement of the job queue. As
a consequence these looking-in effects do not necessarily reflect a negative effect of JCSs.
5.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
We now consider a more flexible time-varying specification of the treatment effect. In line with
the typical program durations of 12 and 24 months and inspired by the peaks in the transition
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Table 4: Baseline Estimation Results
Transition Transition
U→ E U→ JCS
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.23∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.23 (0.23)
Not Eligible for JCS 1991-1992 0.36 (0.28)
Not Eligible for JCS 1993-1999 -0.65∗∗ (0.26)
Unobserved heterogeneity:
v1 -4.81∗∗∗ (0.62) -7.46∗∗∗ (1.16)
v2− v1 1.67∗∗∗ (0.19) -0.44 (0.30)
v3− v1 3.26∗∗∗ (0.26) -0.12 (0.37)
ω2 0.34 (0.30)
ω3 -0.62∗∗ (0.27)
p2 0.48
p3 0.18
corr(vu,vp) -0.43 (0.49)
Duration dependence:
4-6 months 0.03 (0.08) 0.18 (0.20)
7-9 months -0.04 (0.10) 0.39 (0.25)
10-12 months -0.03 (0.12) 0.69∗∗∗ (0.25)
13-18 months -0.08 (0.13) 0.43 (0.27)
19-24 months -0.39∗∗ (0.16) 0.31 (0.31)
25-36 months -0.52∗∗∗ (0.20) 0.24 (0.31)
> 36 months -0.66∗∗∗ (0.23) -0.70∗ (0.38)
Individual characteristics:
Ages 30-34 0.07 (0.16) 0.20 (0.32)
Ages 35-39 0.09 (0.17) 0.50 (0.31)
Ages 40-44 -0.14 (0.18) 0.44 (0.31)
Ages 45-50 -0.40∗∗ (0.19) 0.67∗∗ (0.32)
Ages > 50 -1.16∗∗∗ (0.20) 0.89∗∗∗ (0.34)
Female -1.10∗∗∗ (0.08) -0.08 (0.11)
Partly Vocational Training -0.41 (0.39) -0.23 (0.47)
Vocational Training 1.01∗∗∗ (0.30) -0.02 (0.35)
Advanced Vocational Training 1.00∗∗∗ (0.34) -0.13 (0.42)
Technical College 0.97∗∗∗ (0.32) 0.12 (0.37)
University Degree 1.17∗∗∗ (0.31) 0.37 (0.36)
Regions:
Dessau 0.24 (0.21) -0.25 (0.23)
Halberstadt 0.11 (0.23) -0.30 (0.25)
Halle 0.47∗∗ (0.21) -0.90∗∗∗ (0.31)
Magdeburg 0.28 (0.20) -0.18 (0.22)
Merseburg 0.29 (0.21) -0.15 (0.24)
Sangerhausen 0.18 (0.23) 0.20 (0.26)
Stendal 0.31 (0.22) -0.17 (0.26)
Dummy for remaining unemployment benefit claims -0.23∗∗ (0.09) -0.66∗∗∗ (0.17)
Remaining unemployment benefit claims -0.03∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Unemployment rate -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.03)
N 2,235
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment. Standard errors are in parentheses. Current
year and quarter dummies are not reported. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1%
level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations. 23
rate from the program participation into employment (see Figure 3), we allow for five different
treatment effects dependent on the elapsed treatment duration. δu1 measures the effect of JCSs
for the period tp ≤ t ≤ tp + 11, δu2 for the period tp + 12 ≤ t ≤ tp + 13, δu3 for the period
tp + 14 ≤ t ≤ tp + 23, δu4 for the period tp + 24 ≤ t ≤ tp + 25 and finally δu5 for the period
t > tp+25.
Very similar to the baseline model, the estimated treatment effects indicate that the hazard
rate is significantly lower by 70% in the first 11 months after start of participation (Panel A in
Table 5). In month 12 and 13, the point estimate is positive but insignificant, followed by an
estimated effect close to zero in months 14 to 23 after program start. The hazard rate increases
significantly by 271% 24 to 25 months after entering a JCS. After 25 months, the effect is
still positive but not statistically significant. These results confirm the presence of locking-in
effects: individuals have a significantly reduced job finding probability during participation.
The treatment effect becomes positive and partly significant after the JCS has finished, which is
typically after 12 or 24 months. However, this positive impact on the transition rate to work is
not long-lasting.
In an alternative specification, we estimate treatment effects depending on whether program
entry occurs in the years 1991-1992 or in 1993-1997. The results in Table 5 Panel B show that
the effects of participating in a JCS are stable over time.
We additionally allow the treatment effect to depend on the elapsed unemployment duration
at the moment of the program entry. We distinguish between program start in the first 12 months
of unemployment and after 12 months of unemployment. Table 5 Panel C presents the corre-
sponding treatment effects. The point estimates indicate strong locking-in effects independent
of the elapsed unemployment duration. These effects are stronger for participants who enter
a JCS after month 12 of their unemployment spell. Unemployed who start participating after
one year of unemployment seem to benefit from participation: after a treatment duration of 12
months, they are significantly more likely to find a job compared to nonparticipants.
A potential explanation for this finding is that especially long-term unemployed workers
are affected by human capital depreciation and that for them being (re-)attached to the labor
market has a relatively large value, while for individuals who just entered unemployment these
channels are less relevant, yet.
In a next step we investigate effect heterogeneity with respect to selected observed char-
acteristics. We estimate the treatment effect in the first 11 months after start of the JCS and
the subsequent period and allow for a common shift of both treatment effects depending on
the age, the gender and the skill level. For women and high skilled participants we find a sig-
nificantly positive shift in the treatment effect indicating that these individuals seem to suffer
less from locking-in effects and are more likely to find a job after a typical program duration
of 12 months than male and low/medium skilled participants (see Table 6), whereby the effect
for females is statistically significant only at the 10% level. We find no evidence for effect
heterogeneity with respect to the age of the participants. A joint test suggests that the effect of
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Table 5: Time Dependent Effect of JCS
Coefficient Standard Error
Panel A. Effect of JCS dependent on Time since Program Start
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.22∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months 12 - 13 after program start 0.34 (0.32)
Effect of JCS in months 14 - 23 after program start -0.06 (0.27)
Effect of JCS in months 24 - 25 after program start 1.31∗∗∗ (0.38)
Effect of JCS in months > 25 after program start 0.47 (0.36)
Panel B. Effect of JCS dependent on Year of Program Start
Start occurs in year 1991 - 1992
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.16∗∗∗ (0.34)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.32 (0.32)
Start occurs in year 1993 - 1997
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.25∗∗∗ (0.26)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.18 (0.25)
Panel C. Effect of JCS dependent on Elapsed Unemployment Duration at Time of Program Start
Start occurs in months 1 - 12 of unemployment
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.17∗∗∗ (0.25)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.01 (0.27)
Start occurs in months > 12 of unemployment
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.48∗∗∗ (0.40)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.59∗∗ (0.28)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. Standard errors are in parentheses. This specification includes the same list
of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). The
number of units making a transition from JCS to employment in the corresponding specification can be found in
Table S.1 and S.2 of the Supplementary Appendix. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and
∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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JCSs in the first 11 months is significantly negative while the effect 11 months after the start of
the program becomes significantly positive for high skilled women. We additionally estimate a
model allowing for an interaction effect of being high skilled and being a female. The results
are reported in Table B.2 in the Appendix and joint tests based on this specification lead to
similar conclusions. High skilled women seem to benefit from the participation in JCSs, while
a JCS increases the unemployment duration especially for low- and medium-skilled men. We
additionally estimate a model in which we interact the observed characteristics with both time-
varying treatment indicators. The results are reported in Table B.3 in the Appendix. For none
of the observed characteristics we find significantly different coefficients for the two periods.
In line with that, a comparison of the Log-likelihood values suggests that the restricted model
is the preferred specification. For females, both coefficients are very similar (0.56 and 0.51).
For the high skilled group we find a relatively large and significant coefficient for the first 11
months after program start (1.10). The second coefficient for this group is still positive (0.49),
but with a p-value of 0.11 not statistically significant anymore. Similar to the restricted model,
a joint test still suggests that the effect of a JCS is significantly positive for high skilled women
11 months after the start of the program.
These results are in line with the theoretical idea that high skilled individuals are particu-
larly affected by depreciation and in turn are able to benefit most from participation in JCSs.
Moreover, the results confirm the previous finding in the literature that women might benefit
more from participation in JCSs than men.
Table 6: Effect of JCS dependent on Observed Characteristics
Coefficient Standard Error
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.80∗∗∗ (0.34)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.31 (0.35)
Effect of JCS × Female 0.52∗ (0.27)
Effect of JCS × Age > 45 0.01 (0.26)
Effect of JCS × High skilled 0.68∗∗∗ (0.26)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. Standard errors are in parentheses. This specification includes the same list
of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). The
number of units making a transition from JCS to employment in the corresponding specification can be found in
Table S.1 of the Supplementary Appendix. Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1%
level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
5.3 Subsequent Employment Stability
In this section we report estimation results based on a model with three transition rates: the
transition rate from unemployment to employment, from unemployment into the program and
from employment back to unemployment. Table 7 presents the estimation results for the base-
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line specification. The estimated treatment effects on the exit rate to work are quite similar to
the results we obtain with the baseline specification with two transition rates. We do not find
any evidence for an impact on the employment stability. We also do not find evidence for effect
heterogeneity.22 However, it is important to note that some subgroups become rather small be-
cause only around 50% of the spells end in employment. Therefore, the results with respect to
the effect heterogeneity have to be interpreted with caution.
Table 7: Effect of JCS for Model with Subsequent Employment Stability
Transition Transition
U → E E→U
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.20∗∗∗ (0.21) 0.28 (0.25)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.17 (0.21) 0.00 (0.27)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment. Standard errors (SE) are in parentheses.
This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and includes three
unobserved mass points (M=3). Additionally, we control for the previous unemployment duration and the previous
unemployment duration squared for the transition rate from employment to unemployment. Coefficients (Coef.)
are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
5.4 Multiple Treatment Effects
In this subsection we present estimation results of a model specification which allows for mul-
tiple treatment effects: we investigate the impacts of two treatments, participation in a JCS and
participation in training. To be precise, we estimate three transition rates: the transition rate
from unemployment to employment, the transition rate from unemployment to a JCS and the
transition rate from unemployment to training. We allow for correlations between these three
transition processes. With this specification we are able to test whether our previous results
change when we take into account that some unemployed might participate in a training pro-
gram before or after participation in a JCS. Our data suggests that 8% of all unemployment
spells include treatment only in terms of participation in a JCS and 19% only in terms of par-
ticipation in training. For 2% of all unemployment spells we observe a participation in a JCS
followed by a period of training and 3% had a period of training before entering a JCS.
Table 8 presents the estimation results for this model. Panel A shows the results for a spec-
ification where we only allow for a direct treatment effect of training and JCSs, separately in
the first 11 months and in more than 11 months after start of participation, for the transition rate
from unemployment to employment. Panel B presents the results for a specification where we
22Results of the models with effect heterogeneity are reported in the Supplementary Appendix (see Tables S.5
and S.6).
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allow for a direct treatment effect of training (JCSs), separately in the first 11 months and in
more than 11 months after start of participation, for the transition rate from unemployment to
employment and for the transition rate from unemployment into JCSs (training). Our findings
indicate that our estimated effects of participating in a JCS do not change when taking participa-
tion in training into account. For both programs we observe a reduced impact on the probability
of entering the other program during the first 11 months after program start. For the training
program, we observe an increased probability for entering the JCS after this period. Moreover,
the training program seems to have first a negative and after some time a significantly positive
impact on the transition rate to work.23
In our main specification, we treat an unemployment spell as right censored at the moment
a second participation in a JCS is observed. We additionally estimate a specification where
we model the selection into a second JCS and allow for an impact of a second JCS within the
same unemployment spell. The estimated treatment effects are not affected by taking multiple
treatments into account (see Table S.7 in the Supplementary Appendix).
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In a first sensitivity analysis we extend on the analysis with respect to the heterogeneity of
treatment effects. We additionally allow for a random coefficient for the treatment effect similar
to Richardson and van den Berg (2013). In this model, we allow both treatment effects to vary
with respect to unobserved heterogeneity. For simplicity, we assume that the random coefficient
is the same for the two treatment effects. The random component is allowed to be correlated
with the unobserved heterogeneity in the transition rates from unemployment to employment
and from unemployment into the treatment. For the model with M=3 we estimate two additional
parameters, i.e., we estimate treatment effects which are specific for each of the three latent
groups. It turns out that the model fit, evaluated on the basis of the AIC and the BIC, does not
improve compared to a model with a homogenous treatment effect. This implies that the model
not allowing for random treatment effects is the preferred specification.24
We perform several modifications of the unemployment and treatment definition to check
the robustness of our results. An overview of the estimated treatment effects for the different
specifications can be found in Table 9. All these sensitivity analyses are conducted for the
bivariate duration model consisting of the duration until treatment and duration until transition
to work.
First, we include participants in Mega-JCSs in our analysis. This type of JCS is described in
Section 2.3. These cases are defined by a direct transition from employment into the program.
The data reveal 193 participations in Mega-JCSs. We estimate two different specifications: first,
we include an "artificial" month of unemployment only for Mega-JCS participants and second,
23This result is in accordance with the results found by Bergemann, Fitzenberger, and Speckesser (2009).
24Results of the model with a random coefficient for the treatment effect are reported in the Appendix (see Table
B.4). The Log-likelihood of this model specification amounts to -9,161.2.
28
Table 8: Multiple Treatment Effects
Transition Transition Transition
U → E U → JCS U → Training
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Panel A. Specification 1
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 -1.10∗∗∗ (0.20)
after program start
Effect of JCS in months > 11 0.19 (0.19)
after program start
Effect of Training in months 1 - 11 -0.71∗∗∗ (0.14)
after program start
Effect of Training in months > 11 0.89∗∗∗ (0.15)
after program start
Panel B. Specification 2
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 -1.22∗∗∗ (0.21) -2.02∗∗∗ (0.37)
after program start
Effect of JCS in months > 11 0.05 (0.21) 0.31 (0.20)
after program start
Effect of Training in months 1 - 11 -0.83∗∗∗ (0.15) -1.88∗∗∗ (0.36)
after program start
Effect of Training in months > 11 0.68∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.47∗∗ (0.20)
after program start
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment. Standard errors (SE) are in parentheses.
These specifications include the same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4). The first specifi-
cation (Panel A) includes four unobserved mass points (M=4) and the second (Panel B) three (M=3). Coefficients
(Coef.) are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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we extend each unemployment spell by an "artificial" month of unemployment. In both cases,
the optimal model specification is based on four mass points and we find a significant negative
treatment effect in the first 11 months after program entry. After 11 months after program entry,
the effect is still negative but insignificant in the first specification and negative and significant
at the 10% level in the second specification. The negative point estimate might stem from longer
program durations of Mega-JCSs compared to other types of JCSs: the mean program duration
amounts to 25 months and the median to 22 months.
In a further specification we treat unemployment spells that end in a transition into nonem-
ployment as right censored. We observe 17 transitions to nonemployment in our observation
period. Again, our results are robust. Moreover, we define periods in training with previous and
subsequent unemployment as periods in unemployment. As a consequence the number of un-
employment spells decreases and the length of unemployment spells increases. The estimated
effect of participating in a JCS are very similar to our main specification.
Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis
Coefficient Standard Error
Panel A. Inclusion of Mega-JCS specification 1
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.00∗∗∗ (0.17)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.12 (0.20)
Panel B. Inclusion of Mega-JCS specification 2
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.09∗∗∗ (0.17)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.37∗ (0.20)
Panel C. Transition to nonemployment treated as right censored
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.25∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.23 (0.23)
Panel D. Periods in training defined as periods in unemployment
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.07∗∗∗ (0.21)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.14 (0.22)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. Standard errors are in parentheses. These specifications include the same list
of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4). The first and the second specification (Panel A and B)
include four unobserved mass points (M=4) and the third and the fourth (Panel C and D) three (M=3). Coefficients
are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Next, we investigate how the results change if we control for previous unemployment ex-
perience and if we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is not constant over the different
unemployment spells. For this we allow for an impact of the previous number of unemploy-
ment spells and the cumulated lagged unemployment duration in a flexible way. We include
two dummies for the number of previous unemployment spells, one if we observe one previous
unemployment spell and another dummy variable indicating whether we observe more than one
previous unemployment spell. Additionally, we include four dummy variables for the cumu-
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lated lagged time spent in unemployment. In the first model where we assume independent
unobserved heterogeneity the model with two discrete groups (M=2) is the preferred specifica-
tion (see Table S.8 in the Supplementary Appendix). While we get a slightly more positive view
of the treatment effects based on this specification, the overall picture is rather stable. Once we
allow for common unobserved heterogeneity across different spells of the same individuals, all
dummy variables capturing previous unemployment experience are much smaller and not sta-
tistically significant anymore (see Table S.9 in the Supplementary Appendix). Moreover, the
treatment effects are very similar compared to the main specification. Comparing the model fit
with the model assuming independent unobserved heterogeneity clearly suggests that the model
using multiple unemployment spells is the preferred specification.
The final sensitivity analysis deals with potentially endogenous right-censoring. See for ex-
ample Cockx and Picchio (2012) for a transition model taking endogenous right-censoring into
account. Our main specification is based on the assumption that right-censoring is – conditional
on observed characteristics – random. We investigate whether a model allowing for endoge-
nous right-censoring leads to different results. In this specification, we define a residual and
absorbing state which includes transitions to training, JCS after April 1997 and to a second JCS
in the same unemployment spell, and transitions to education, maternity leave and retirement.
We jointly estimate our main specification with the transition process to this residual state. The
results are reported in Table B.5 in the Appendix. The estimated treatment effects are stable.
Moreover, we do not find evidence that the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the transition
process from unemployment to the absorbing state are statistically significant. This suggests
that endogenous right-censoring is not a problem for our specification.
6 Conclusions
JCSs are used in many countries in order to fight high unemployment. This paper focuses on
JCSs in East Germany during very turbulent economic times, notably the aftermath of the Ger-
man reunification in 1990. We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the employment
prospects of participants in JCSs based on data of an inflow sample of unemployed workers
in one East German state (Sachsen-Anhalt). We use the timing-of-events approach that is very
well suited, particularly given the economic environment of our evaluation. Firstly, we do not
need to rely on the informational content of the employment history of individuals in order to
be able to control of unobserved heterogeneity and secondly, the focus on transition rates might
be more appropriate given the economy is not in a stable equilibrium.
We analyze whether participation in JCSs has an impact on both the probability of finding a
job and the subsequent employment stability. The econometric analysis is based on multivariate
duration models. We estimate bivariate models based on the transition rates from unemploy-
ment to JCSs and from unemployment to work. We also estimate models with three transition
processes taking additionally into account the transition rate from employment back to unem-
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ployment. Our approach allows to control for selection into treatment based on observable and
on unobservable characteristics.
In this study, we focus on individual employment outcomes under the assumption of exis-
tence of the program. This is a common approach in the literature on evaluating ALMPs. In the
context of JCSs it is important to keep in mind that this approach does not capture the poten-
tial value of the work carried out within JCSs. Moreover, this implies that we ignore potential
spillover effects on the employment probabilities of the workers who are not participating in
JCSs. However, especially in times of massive job destruction and high unemployment rates,
the locking-in effects of JCSs might at least partly reflect a rearrangement of the job queue. If
participation of some job-seekers has an impact on the job queue in the short run and increases
or stabilizes the human capital of the participants in the medium run, negative locking-in effects
have to be interpreted with caution. Analyzing these potential spillover effects in combination
with locking-in effects is an interesting topic for future research.
In parts our findings are in accordance with results in more stable economies. During the
typical participation period of 12 months we find the expected negative effect on the probability
of finding a regular job. This effect vanishes thereafter and becomes insignificantly positive.
However, in contrast to findings in more stable economies our results suggest that female and
highly skilled participants leave unemployment quicker than other groups. This is in line with
the idea that high skilled workers might be more strongly affected by human capital deprecia-
tion and therefore participation in JCSs has a stronger impact on them. Moreover, it confirms
previous findings that women seem to benefit more from JCSs. Another important result which
is new to the literature concerns the stability of jobs after participation. We do not find that the
job retention rates are influenced by JCSs; not on average and also not if effect heterogeneity is
taken into account. Additionally, we find weak evidence that long-term unemployed also gain
from participation in JCSs.
These results add to the so far scarce evidence on the effectiveness of JCSs in transformation
economies. The findings show that it is important to not transfer the negative evaluation results
on JCSs that are found for stable and rather matured economies to situations that are more
turbulent. In situations with high job destruction rates other and/or additional labor market
groups might benefit from participation in JCSs. It seems likely that this conclusion transfers to
other economic crises than the transformation process.
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Appendix
A Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Sample Selection
Selection Criteria Resulting Number of Observations
Fully observed labor market history and year of birth 10,715
Aged between 25 and 50 years in January 1990 6,088
Employed in June 1990 5,529
No missings in education variable 5,466
Final sample on individual level:
Having at least one unemployment spell starting since 1991 2,235
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table A.2: Definition of Variables
Variable Definition Time-varying?
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11
after program start
Dummy for participating in a JCS in months 1
- 11 after program start
Time-varying
Effect of JCS in months > 11
after program start
Dummy for participating in a JCS in months >
11 after program start
Time-varying
Not eligible for JCS 1991-
1992
Dummy for not being eligible for participating
in a JCS in 1991-1992 according to the Em-
ployment Promotion Act (less than 6 months
unemployed in last 12 months)
Time-varying
Not eligible for JCS 1993-
1997
Dummy for not being eligible for participating
in a JCS in 1993-1997 according to the Em-
ployment Promotion Act (less than 6 months
unemployed in last 12 months)
Time-varying
Individual characteristics:
Age Groups Dummies for being in corresponding age
group during observation period
Time-varying
Ages 25-29 Aged between 25 and 29 Time-varying
Ages 30-34 Aged between 30 and 34 Time-varying
Ages 35-39 Aged between 35 and 39 Time-varying
Ages 40-44 Aged between 40 and 44 Time-varying
Ages 45-50 Aged between 45 and 50 Time-varying
Ages >50 Aged 50 and older Time-varying
Female Dummy for being female Constant
. . .
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Table A.2: Definition of Variables (Continuation)
Variable Definition Time-varying?
Professional Education Dummies for highest professional education
level
Constant
No Vocational Training No Vocational Training Constant
Partly Vocational Training Partly Vocational Training (Teilfacherbeiter) Constant
Vocational Training Vocational Training (Facharbeiter) Constant
Advanced Vocational Training Advanced Vocational Training (Meister, Tech-
niker)
Constant
Technical College Technical College (Fachschule) Constant
University Degree University Degree (Universität, Fach-
hochschule)
Constant
Regions: Dummies for living in one of eight labor mar-
ket districts of Sachsen-Anhalt
Constant
Dessau Dessau Constant
Halberstadt Halberstadt Constant
Halle Halle Constant
Magdeburg Magdeburg Constant
Merseburg Merseburg Constant
Sangerhausen Sangerhausen Constant
Stendal Stendal Constant
Wittenberg Wittenberg Constant
Year Dummies Dummies indicating the current year, ranging
from 1991-1998
Time-varying
Quarter Dummies Dummies indicating the current quarter of the
year
Time-varying
Unemployment rate Monthly unemployment rates by labor market
districts
Time-varying
Dummy for remaining unem-
ployment benefit claims
Dummy for months of remaining unemploy-
ment benefit claims
Time-varying
Remaining unemployment
benefit claims
Months of remaining unemployment benefit
claims
Time-varying
Notes: JCS: Job Creation Scheme. The time constant explanatory variables are measured at the date of the interview.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table A.3: Labor Market Transitions in %
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
⇒ JCS 10.7 ⇒ Employment 26.3
(415) (109)
2nd JCS
15.9
(66)
Training
22.9
(95)
JCS after April 1997
9.2
(38)
Education
0.5
(2)
3,864
Maternal Leave
1.2
unemployment (5)
spells
Retirement
0.7
(3)
RC (September 1997)
13.7
(57)
RC (October 1998)
3.9
(16)
RC (December 1999) 5.8
(24)
Employment
47.6
(1,643)
Training
23.9
(825)
⇒ JCS after April 1997 3.7
(128)
Education
0.3
(12)
Maternal Leave
0.3
(11)
Retirement
1.0
(36)
RC (September 1997)
7.1
(245)
RC (October 1998)
3.6
(124)
RC (December 1999) 12.3
(425)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. RC: Right-censoring due to end of observation period which can be September
1997, October 1998 or December 1999 depending on the wave of the survey. Absolute values are in parentheses.
Transitions to training and to JCSs that started after April 1997 are treated as right censored.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table A.4: Summary Statistics of Unemployment Spells
Quantiles
N Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Number of spells per individual 2,235 1.7 1.0 1 1 1 2 7
Transition U→ E
Unemployment duration 1,752 9.1 10.3 1 2 5 12 85
JCS duration 109 13 9 1 7 12 13 60
Subsequent employment duration
(complete spell) 863 17 17 1 5 12 23 104
Subsequent employment duration
(right censored spell) 889 38 28 1 13 33 60 107
Transition U→ Other LMS
Unemployment duration 1,221 16 15 1 5 12 22 95
JCS duration 209 15 9 2 12 12 16 59
RC due to end of observation period
Unemployment duration 891 22 23 1 6 14 31 107
JCS duration 97 17 13 1 12 12 22 60
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, E: Employment, LMS: Labor Market State. RC: Right-
censoring. SD: Standard deviation. Complete employment spells end with a transition to another labor market
state within the observation period.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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B Estimation Results
Table B.1: Model Fit depending on the Specification of the Unobserved Heterogeneity
Unobserved Heterogeneity (UH) No UH 2 Mass Points 3 Mass Points 4 Mass Points
Log-likelihood -9,300.4 -9,178.8 -9,161.3 -9,160.2
AIC 18,764.9 18,527.5 18,498.6 18,502.3
BIC 19,233.3 19,013.0 19,001.3 19,022.1
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Figure B.1: Empirical and Predicted Transition Rate to Employment
Notes: Empirical exit rates are based on the first unemployment spell.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table B.2: Effect of JCS for High Skilled Women
Coefficient Standard Error
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.80∗∗∗ (0.37)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.33 (0.36)
Effect of JCS × Female 0.63 (0.39)
Effect of JCS × High skilled 0.81∗∗ (0.41)
Effect of JCS × Female × High skilled -0.34 (0.52)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. Standard errors are in parentheses. This specification includes the same list of
covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). Coefficients
are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table B.3: Effect of JCS dependent on Observed Characteristics
Coefficient Standard Error
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -2.20∗∗∗ (0.49)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start -0.19 (0.37)
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start × Female 0.56 (0.44)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start × Female 0.51 (0.32)
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start × Age > 45 0.36 (0.44)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start × Age > 45 -0.12 (0.31)
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start × High skilled 1.10∗∗∗ (0.42)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start × High skilled 0.49 (0.30)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. Standard errors are in parentheses. This specification includes the same list of
covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). Coefficients
are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
Table B.4: Effect of JCS dependent on Unobserved Characteristics
Coefficient Standard Error
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 1.44∗∗∗ (0.28)
Effect of JCS -1.03∗ (0.53)
Unobserved heterogeneity in treatment effect:
v2− v1 0.32 (0.30)
v3− v1 -0.64∗∗ (0.27)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme. Standard errors are in parentheses. This specification includes the same
list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and includes three unobserved mass points (M=3).
Coefficients are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5% and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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Table B.5: Effect of JCS for Model with Endogenous Right-Censoring
Transition Transition
U → E U → Other LMS
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Effect of JCS in months 1 - 11 after program start -1.16∗∗∗ (0.21) -1.42∗∗∗ (0.23)
Effect of JCS in months > 11 after program start 0.30 (0.22) 0.72∗∗∗ (0.13)
Notes: JCS: Job creation scheme, U: Unemployment, LMS: Labor Market State. Standard errors (SE) are in
parentheses. This specification includes the same list of covariates as the baseline specification (see Table 4) and
includes three unobserved mass points (M=3). Coefficients (Coef.) are statistically significant at the ∗10%, ∗∗ 5%
and ∗∗∗ 1% level.
Source: LMM-SA, 1997-1999, own computations.
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